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An Initial Coin Offering (“ICO”) is the first time a blockchain-based company sells 
its cryptocurrency to the public. ICOs provide any blockchain entrepreneur the abil-
ity to quickly receive funding from anyone in the world. While ICOs show the po-
tential to become a legitimate alternative to traditional early-stage investing, like 
angel investing and venture capital, ICOs are currently teeming with fraud and bad 
actors. Recent celebrity-endorsed ICOs have scammed customers, and hundreds of 
millions of dollars have been stolen from hard-working people. Anything goes in 
this current, unregulated ICO space. 
 
This article proposes five potential ICO-specific regulations for the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (“SEC”) to pass in the next 12 months. First, the SEC should 
broaden the definition of a security to include utility tokens which will allow the 
SEC to have authority over this space. Second, allow companies conducting an ICO 
in the U.S. to satisfy a more lenient securities filing requirement. Third, allow peo-
ple of all backgrounds to participate in ICOs, not just accredited or sophisticated 
investors. Fourth, create a private right of action for token buyers to sue blockchain 
companies who make fraudulent statements in its filed white paper or token regis-
tration. Finally, extend securities fraud liability to fraudulent ICO advertisements. 
 
The goal of these proposed regulations is to balance the needs of all parties in-
volved: removing fraud from the market, prioritizing investor confidence and secu-
rity, and increasing development of blockchain technology’s potential. While these 
regulations will not solve all cryptocurrency-related problems, passing them is a 
good first step. 
                                                          
* Kenyon Briggs is a J.D. candidate at the University of Missouri—Columbia School of Law, anticipated 
graduation May 2019. Dual B.A. from Graceland University in Lamoni, IA, 2016, summa cum laude. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
One word likely rang out at your family’s Thanksgiving in 2017 amidst the 
mashed potato passing and food coma napping: Bitcoin.1 The end of 2017 saw 
Bitcoin explode into the mainstream.2 First, popular news sources like The Wall 
Street Journal, CNN, and Forbes began covering Bitcoin.3 Then, stories of everyday 
people becoming overnight Bitcoin millionaires emerged.4 “Bitcoin-mania” en-
sued.5 Millions of people hurried to purchase Bitcoin on “cryptocurrency ex-
changes”—websites created to facilitate virtual currency trading—and many even 
told their grandmothers to buy while Bitcoin was on the rise.6 At its peak, popular 
cryptocurrency exchanges like Coinbase and Binance were adding more than 
100,000 new traders every day.7 However, when people realized that Bitcoin, with 
a price far exceeding $10,000 per Bitcoin in December of 2017,8 would not turn 
them into millionaires like the people on TV, many began buying other cryptocur-
rencies with hopes of holding the “next Bitcoin” before it took off.9 
Bitcoin is a type of cryptocurrency, which is a broad term encompassing any 
“digital or virtual currency that use[s] cryptography for security” that is created and 
sold by its developer (a “blockchain company”) on the internet.10 When a crypto-
currency is first sold to the public, this event is called an initial coin offering 
(“ICO”); the concept of an ICO is similar to when a corporation first sells its stock 
to the public in an event called an initial public offering (“IPO”).11 However, there 
are significant differences between IPOs and ICOs.  
                                                          
 1. Peter Rudegeair & Akane Otani, Bitcoin Mania: Even Grandma Wants In on the Action, Wall 
Street J. (Nov. 29, 2017, 6:04 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/bitcoin-mania-even-grandma-wants-
in-on-the-action-1511996653. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id.; Tal Yellin, Dominic Aratari & Jose Pagliery, What is bitcoin?, CNN, 
https://money.cnn.com/infographic/technology/what-is-bitcoin/ (last updated Aug. 8, 2018); Chris 
Kline, Five Reasons Bitcoin Will Be Your Best High-Growth Investment For 2018, FORBES (Nov. 27, 
2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2017/11/27/five-reasons-bitcoin-will-be-your-
best-high-growth-investment-for-2018/#32d5680347e8. 
 4. Chloe Aiello, Teenage Bitcoin Millionaire: “It’s a Wonderful Time to Buy Bitcoin”, CNBC (Dec. 
15, 2017, 6:29 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/12/15/teenage-bitcoin-millionaire-its-a-wonderful-
time-to-buy-bitcoin.html. 
 5. Rudegeair, supra note 1. 
 6. Id. (Myself included—KB). 
 7. Joseph Young, Exponential Growth: Cryptocurrency Exchanges Are Adding 100,000+ Users Per 
Day, COINTELEGRAPH (Jan. 7, 2018), https://cointelegraph.com/news/exponential-growth-cryptocur-
rency-exchanges-are-adding-100000-users-per-day. 
 8. Stan Higgins, From $900 to $20,000: Bitcoin’s Historic 2017 Price Run Revisited, COINDESK, 
https://www.coindesk.com/900-20000-bitcoins-historic-2017-price-run-revisited/ (last updated Dec. 30, 
2017, 16:20 UTC). 
 9. Panos Mourdoukoutas, Ripple Could be the Next Bitcoin, FORBES (Mar. 7, 2018), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/panosmourdoukoutas/2018/03/07/ripple-could-be-the-next-
bitcoin/#2afd5d6f5b39 (Ripple, which shares similarities to Bitcoin, is the name of another type of cryp-
tocurrency.). 
 10. Richard Kastelein, What Initial Coin Offerings Are, and Why VC Firms Care, HARV. BUS. REV. 
(Mar. 24, 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/03/what-initial-coin-offerings-are-and-why-vc-firms-care 
(“Here’s how an ICO typically works: A new cryptocurrency is created on a protocol such as Counter-
party, Ethereum, or Openledger, and a value is arbitrarily determined by the startup team behind the ICO 
based on what they think the network is worth at its current stage.”). 
 11. Bitcoin Magazine, What is an ICO?, NASDAQ (Aug. 10, 2017, 3:34 PM), 
http://www.nasdaq.com/article/what-is-an-ico-cm830484. 
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Unlike an IPO, where the purchaser acquires equity—an actual ownership 
share of the company—and receives certain legal protections through securities 
laws, most ICO purchasers receive no equity rights and, instead, usually prepay for 
blockchain-related services.12 Additionally, it is unclear whether securities laws ap-
ply to ICOs.13 Because ICOs currently operate in a regulatory gray area, there is 
uncertainty whether securities laws can protect ICO purchasers.14 Amidst this un-
certainty, fraudulent ICOs stole hundreds of millions of dollars from ICO purchas-
ers.15 
Many believe an ICO will eventually be a safe and legitimate fundraising tool,16 
but ICOs are currently the “Wild West of financing” because of the uncertainty 
surrounding potentially applicable laws.17 Because of this gray area, on February 6, 
2018, the chairmen of the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) and Com-
modity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) met with the Senate Committee on 
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs in Washington D.C., which represented a first 
step toward illuminating the ICO space with regulation.18 Both J. Christopher 
Giancarlo, Chairman of the CFTC, and SEC Chairman Jay Clayton expressed opti-
mistic views for blockchain and ICOs.19 However, Giancarlo and Clayton also ex-
plained that ICOs need regulation.20 Specifically, the chairmen said that ICOs need 
additional protection against “fraud and market manipulation.”21 The statements 
from Chairmen Clayton and Giancarlo affirm the thrust of this article: the United 
States needs a set of ICO-specific laws to protect investors, cut out bad actors, and 
strengthen the ecosystem so blockchain-based projects may fundraise in the future. 
In order for someone to truly understand this article’s arguments, the reader 
must understand five things: ICOs, blockchain technology, the three different types 
of cryptocurrency, complex securities laws, and the current landscape this all takes 
place in. Additionally, three specific concepts must be defined and explored: cryp-
tocurrency, blockchain technology, and ICOs. Unfortunately, a circular organiza-
tional problem is present: what should this article define and explore first? An ICO 
is the initial sale of cryptocurrency, but cryptocurrency is built on blockchain tech-
nology, and blockchain technology projects are often funded by ICOs.22 The author 
                                                          
 12. Virtual Currencies: Examining Cryptocurrencies and ICO Markets, H. Sub. Comm. on Capital 
Markets, Securities, and Investment, 105th Cong. C-SPAN 00:01:35 (2018) (statement of Bill Huizenga, 
Chairman, H. Sub. Comm. on Capital Mkts., Sec. & Inv.), https://www.c-span.org/video/?442556-
1/hearing-focuses-cryptocurrency-markets&start=44 [hereinafter Virtual Currencies]. 
 13. Kastelein, supra note 10. 
 14. Id. 
 15. See infra Part III.B. 
 16. Dylan Dedi, SEC and CFTC Hearing: More Legitimate ICOs or “If There Was No Bitcoin, There 
Would Be No Blockchain”, COINTELEGRAPH (Feb. 6, 2018), https://cointelegraph.com/news/sec-and-
cftc-hearing-more-legitimate-icos-or-if-there-was-no-bitcoin-there-would-be-no-blockchain. 
 17. Kastelein, supra note 10. 
 18. Dedi, supra note 16. 
 19. Id. (Gincarlo was more optimistic than Clayton, explaining how a “do no harm” regulatory ap-
proach was used during the early days of the internet, and that allowed revolutionary changes in areas 
like telecommunications, commerce, and transportation. Likewise, Giancarlo believes a “do no harm” 
approach is appropriate for blockchain technology). 
 20. Id. (while ICOs needed the most regulation, Clayton explained that blockchain technology needed 
the least regulation, and virtual currencies were somewhere in the middle). 
 21. Id. 
 22. What is an ICO?, surpa note 11; Blockchain, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.in-
vestopedia.com/terms/b/blockchain.asp (last visited Sept. 29, 2018). 
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found it almost impossible to define one without discussing the other two, but each 
is an extremely complex concept, and they must be explored one at a time. 
An additional organizational problem was whether to first explore the current 
fraud and market manipulation occurring in the ICO space, or to begin by analyzing 
existing securities laws, show how it is unclear whether these laws relate to ICOs, 
and then demonstrate how that ambiguity has contributed to the recent ICO fraud. 
The author, realizing there is no perfect concept to start with, selected the best place 
he thought to begin.  
Accordingly, Part II explores this article’s three fundamental concepts in the 
following order: cryptocurrency, blockchain technology, and ICOs. A reader should 
have a basic understanding of all three concepts at the conclusion of Part II. While 
the author attempts to provide enough information to inform most readers, some 
may find it helpful to consult additional sources if there is still confusion at the end 
of Part II. 
Then, Part III looks at the current state of ICOs and the potentially applicable 
securities laws. Part III first looks at the laws that may relate to the initial sale of 
cryptocurrency, and then it analyzes the famous “Howey Test.” After the laws are 
laid out, Part III demonstrates how current securities laws do not apply to ICOs 
perfectly; this ambiguity allows bad actors to occupy the space. There is too much 
uncertainty about whether the SEC may regulate cryptocurrency. Understanding 
this makes it easier to see why new, ICO-specific laws can help clear up the confu-
sion. Additionally, this article’s first proposed regulation is introduced in Part III: 
the SEC should broaden the definition of a security to include utility tokens, which 
will give token holders the protections that federal securities laws provide. 
After all of the fundamental concepts have been defined, the laws have been 
laid out, and the bad actors have been exposed, Part IV—the crux of this article—
recommends new, ICO-specific regulations that the SEC should enact. Part V con-
cludes by looking at how these new regulations could improve the legitimacy of 
ICOs, cut down on the number of bad actors, and help blockchain technology con-
tinue to grow. 
This article’s intended audience is Congress, the SEC, and anyone who has the 
ability to influence laws that can clean up the ICO process and protect ICO purchas-
ers. A second audience is any lawyer who practices in securities, cryptocurrency, 
blockchain, the Internet of Things, venture capital, private equity, or general start 
up law. While the author would like for lay readers to be able to understand this 
article, someone who does not have any prior understanding of blockchain, crypto-
currency, and securities law may struggle to follow along, unfortunately. 
This article’s goal is to achieve balance. Regulation must have enough strength 
to remove bad actors, but also have enough seller-friendly attributes so blockchain 
developers can continue building on an open blockchain. Regulation must have 
enough strength to protect investors from fraudulent ICOs, but also have enough 
investor-friendly attributes so everyone can help propel blockchain development 
forward. 
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II.  BEFORE MOVING FORWARD: DEFINING AND EXPLORING THREE 
FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS 
In order for this article to make sense, three fundamental concepts must be de-
fined and explored: cryptocurrency, blockchain technology, and ICOs. Remember, 
it is impossible to fully define one without referencing the others. Additionally, due 
to the complexity of these concepts, countless pages could be written on each. For 
example, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (“NIST”) published a 
fifty-plus page document overviewing blockchain technology.23 This article merely 
attempts to provide all readers with a low-level understanding of the core concepts 
before moving forward. 
A.  Cryptocurrency: Exploring the Differences Between 
Coins, Security Tokens, and Utility Tokens 
Cryptocurrency is a broad term. It includes any “digital or virtual currency that 
use[s] cryptography for security.”24 However, there are several different cryptocur-
rencies, and they are not all the same. Accordingly, this article attempts to break the 
general term, cryptocurrency, into three sub-types: coins, security tokens, and utility 
tokens.25 This taxonomy of cryptocurrency is helpful because understanding the 
differences between them is key when considering how to regulate their initial sale. 
Additionally, it is important to grasp the differences because the proposed regula-
tions introduced in Part IV only apply to utility tokens. This article does not propose 
SEC regulations that apply to coins or security tokens. 
A short definition of “coins” is cryptocurrency that is commonly thought of as 
a form of digital money capable of replacing paper money like the dollar.26 “Secu-
rity tokens” are usually synonymous with investment contracts or stock in a block-
chain company.27 Finally, “utility tokens” are often considered to be the pre-pur-
chase of a blockchain-empowered product or service.28 
The lines between the three types of cryptocurrency are not always clear. For 
example, a cryptocurrency can be a security token in the hands of an investor even 
though the company intended it to be a utility token.29 Additionally, a cryptocur-
rency can change over the course of its life.30 This article recognizes that not all 
                                                          
 23. Dylan Yaga et al., Blockchain Technology Overview, NIST, (Oct. 2018), https://nvl-
pubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2018/NIST.IR.8202.pdf. 
 24. Kastelein, supra note 10. 
 25. Lukas Schor, 8 Important Things to Know About Security Tokens/Token Regulation, MEDIUM 
(Nov. 22, 2017), https://medium.com/@argongroup/8-important-things-to-know-about-security-tokens-
token-regulation-3d548a1a6367; Micha Benoliel, Understanding the Difference Between Coins, Utility 
Tokens, and Tokenized Securities, MEDIUM (Aug. 8, 2017), https://medium.com/startup-grind/under-
standing-the-difference-between-coins-utility-tokens-and-tokenized-securities-a6522655fb91 (there is 
no commonly accepted taxonomy of cryptocurrency). 
 26. Schor, supra note 25; Benoliel, supra note 25. 
 27. Schor, supra note 25; Benoliel, supra note 25. 
 28. Schor, supra note 25; Benoliel, supra note 25. 
 29. Schor, supra note 25 (“This might lead to many projects being classified as securities even though 
they initially setup their tokens as a utility, just because the economic reality is that the contributors invest 
primarily because of anticipation of profits.”). 
 30. Id. (“It’s important to note that tokens can change their position on the graph over time. Especially 
when tokens are being sold prior to having a product / utility in place but develop this use-value at a later 
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cryptocurrencies are the same, and a taxonomy may help readers to see the differ-
ences. Regardless, SEC Chairman Clayton stated that the SEC will regulate sub-
stance over form.31 So, in the eyes of the SEC, the specific name given to any cryp-
tocurrency has little value. 
Coins should be thought of as stores of value, digital gold, or virtual currency.32 
Bitcoin is the most well-known example of a coin.33 However, professionals disa-
gree about what someone acquires when they purchase a coin, and where Bitcoin 
draws its value from.34 Some, including former Chairman of the Federal Reserve, 
Alan Greenspan, argue that Bitcoin has no intrinsic value; as a result, its value is 
not tied to anything, leaving it susceptible to the “greater fool” theory of demand.35 
Others propose a circular line of reasoning that Bitcoin’s only source of intrinsic 
value is its ability to store value, so the holder of a coin is similar to the holder of 
real gold.36 And many, including Chairmen Clayton and Giancarlo, think Bitcoin’s 
value is “tied to [the process of] mining” Bitcoin.37 
Security tokens represent cryptocurrencies that “constitute an investment con-
tract, where the main use-case, and the reason for the contributors to buy the tokens, 
is the anticipation of future profits in [the] form of dividends, revenue share or (most 
commonly) price appreciation.”38 It is worth noting that the accounting firm Ernst 
& Young conducted market research of the ICO space, and it concluded security 
tokens are “rarely used.”39 While a company may not call its cryptocurrency a se-
curity token, and may even intentionally create a cryptocurrency without any equity 
or voting rights, SEC Chairman Clayton said, “I believe every ICO I’ve seen is a 
security” due to investor desires for price appreciation.40 
                                                          
point. This actually applies to most pre-product ICO’s that are currently being launched, which might aim 
to achieve being a utility token but are in fact an investment contract during the time of issuance.”). 
 31. Public Statement from Jay Clayton, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement on Cryp-
tocurrencies & Initial Coin Offerings, (Dec. 11, 2017) https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/state-
ment-clayton-2017-12-11 [hereinafter Clayton Statement]. 
 32. Schor, supra note 25; Benoliel, supra note 25. 
 33. Zach LeBeau, What’s the Difference Between an ‘ICO’ and a ‘Token Launch’?, MEDIUM (Dec. 
29, 2017), https://medium.com/@SingularDTV/whats-the-difference-between-an-ico-and-a-token-
launch-d892d4d689a4 (“Coins really only have one utility—to act as simple stores of value with limited-
to-no other functionality. By “simple” value, I mean value not represented or manifested through a va-
riety of dynamic functions.”). 
 34. Jason Bloomberg, What is Bitcoin’s Elusive Intrinsic Value?, FORBES (June 26, 2017, 5:22 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jasonbloomberg/2017/06/26/what-is-bitcoins-elusive-intrinsic-
value/#76ac6d4f7194. 
 35. Id.; Greater Fool Theory, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/g/greaterfoolthe-
ory.asp (last visited Oct. 6, 2018) (“If acting in accordance with the greater fool theory, an investor will 
purchase questionably priced securities without any regard to their quality. If the theory holds, the in-
vestor will still be able to quickly sell them off to another “greater fool,” who could also be hoping to 
flip them quickly. Unfortunately, speculative bubbles burst eventually, leading to a rapid depreciation in 
share prices.”). 
 36. Bloomberg, supra note 34. 
 37. Dedi, supra note 16; Bitcoin Mining News, COINTELEGRAPH, https://cointele-
graph.com/tags/bitcoin-mining (last visited Oct. 6, 2018) (“Bitcoin mining is a peer-to-peer process of 
adding data into Bitcoin’s public ledger in order to verify and secure a contract. Groups of recorded 
transactions are gathered in blocks and then added into the Bitcoin blockchain.”). 
 38. Schor, supra note 25. 
 39. See generally EY Research: Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs), ERNST & YOUNG, 24 (Dec. 2017), 
http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/ey-research-initial-coin-offerings-icos/%24File/ey-re-
search-initial-coin-offerings-icos.pdf. 
 40. Stan Higgins, SEC Chief Clayton: ‘Every ICO I’ve Seen is a Security’, COINDESK (Feb. 6, 2018, 
19:30 UTC), https://www.coindesk.com/sec-chief-clayton-every-ico-ive-seen-security/. 
6
The Business, Entrepreneurship & Tax Law Review, Vol. 2 [2018], Iss. 2, Art. 9
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/betr/vol2/iss2/9
430 B.E.T.R. [Vol. 2 2018 
Finally, utility tokens are the most popular type of cryptocurrency for an ICO 
to sell, and refer to a pre-purchase of future blockchain services, often initially sold 
for a discount.41 Buying a utility token from a blockchain company is like buying 
Chuck E. Cheese’s tokens one year before the arcade opens, but with a $0.05 per-
token discount; because one token entitles the holder to one arcade game, the buyer 
may either play pinball or sell their token at the market rate of $0.25 for a profit 
when the arcade opens a year later.42 
B. Blockchain: Exploring Why It is so Important 
The second fundamental concept in this article is blockchain technology. While 
not the direct focus of this article, it is something readers should be familiar with 
because it has real utility in the world.43 Author Steven Johnson wrote an article in 
the New York Times Magazine titled “Beyond the Bitcoin Bubble.”44 Johnson ar-
gued that while everyone was distracted with the get-rich-quick “Bitcoin Bubble” 
at the end of 2017, there was “something much more important than wealth” being 
built: blockchain ledger technology.45 
Blockchains are “open,” meaning anyone can use and improve it because no 
single entity is “in charge” of it.46 Because blockchain technology is a public ledger 
that records information spreading out across countless hard drives (“distributed”), 
it is extremely difficult to tamper with.47 Applications can also be built on top of, 
and powered through, blockchain technology.48 Cryptocurrency is one type of 
blockchain application, but other blockchain applications include smart contracts 
and data/logistics tracking.49 Imagine how accurate financial audits and regulatory 
compliance would be with a perfect record of everything the client did. Johnson 
believes the Bitcoin Bubble distracted people from the “revolutionary break-
through” that is blockchain ledger technology: “History is replete with stories of 
new technologies whose initial applications ends up having little to do with their 
eventual use.”50 
                                                          
 41. EY Research, supra note 39; Josiah Wilmoth, The Difference Between Utility Tokens and Equity 
Tokens, STRATEGIC COIN, https://strategiccoin.com/difference-utility-tokens-equity-tokens/ (last visited 
Oct. 6, 2018). 
 42. Ash Bennington, Utility Coins or Crypto Assets? Token Terminology Is One Big Grey Area, 
COINDESK, https://www.coindesk.com/utility-coins-crypto-assets-token-terminology-one-big-gray-
area/ (last updated Sept. 6, 2017, 9:01 UTC). 
 43. See Steven Johnson, Beyond the Bitcoin Bubble, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 16, 2018), https://www.ny-
times.com/2018/01/16/magazine/beyond-the-bitcoin-bubble.html (“The Bitcoin bubble may ultimately 
turn out to be a distraction from the true significance of the blockchain.”). 
 44. Id. 
 45. Johnson, supra note 43. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Blockchain, supra note 22 (“A blockchain is a digitized, decentralized, public ledger of all cryp-
tocurrency transactions. Constantly growing as ‘completed’ blocks (the most recent transactions) are 
recorded and added to it in chronological order, it allows market participants to keep track of digital 
currency transactions without central recordkeeping. Each node (a computer connected to the network) 
gets a copy of the blockchain, which is downloaded automatically.”). 
 48. Id. (explaining that blockchain can be a “pretty reliable way” to store many different types of data, 
including banking transactions, healthcare, property records, smart contracts, supply chains, and even 
voting). 
 49. Id. 
 50. Johnson, supra note 43. 
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While the concept of an open, public ledger may not appear exciting, it has the 
potential to change the way the world does business.51 In an attempt to put block-
chain’s potential into perspective, Johnson points out that the internet, email, and 
GPS also began as open technologies.52 Take GPS for example: originally devel-
oped and used exclusively by the United States military, it became open in the 1980s 
and began to be used by the aviation industry.53 Then, individual consumers and 
businesses soon developed in-car navigation, which quickly led to GPS enabled 
smartphones.54 Now, GPS allows us to do everything from finding “nearby restau-
rants to playing Pokémon Go to coordinating disaster-relief efforts.”55 Imagine how 
different the world would be today if GPS had not been open. 
Encouraging blockchain technology growth should be a goal for policymakers, 
and the easiest way to allow growth to continue is to keep it open. Chairmen 
Giancarlo and Clayton agree that of the three crypto-related spaces—ICOs, crypto-
currency, and blockchain technology—blockchain technology needs the least 
amount of regulation, if any.56 Today, people building blockchain-based applica-
tions consider ICOs a legitimate option to raise money for their projects.57 The au-
thor thinks if the fraud that ravaged early ICOs is cleaned up through new SEC 
regulations, more genuine blockchain-based projects will be funded. This may al-
low the potential world-changing power of blockchain technology to arrive sooner. 
C. What is an ICO and How Does It Work? 
An ICO is the first time a blockchain company sells its cryptocurrency to the 
public.58 On one side of the transaction, the buyer receives the benefit of having 
access to the ground floor of a blockchain company, usually at a discount.59 On the 
other side of the deal, entrepreneurs can raise money “on a level playing field,”60 
allowing them to access “vibrant sources of capital” without having connections in 
Silicon Valley or New York City.61 Indeed, an estimated $4 billion was raised from 
210 ICOs conducted in 2017.62 Additionally, an estimated 480 ICOs raised $1.66 
billion in the first quarter of 2018 alone.63 
Some ICOs can provide significant funding for blockchain-based projects. 
Take, for example, the ICO that sold a cryptocurrency called “Filecoin,” created by 
                                                          
 51. Id. 
 52. Johnson, supra note 43. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Dedi, supra note 16. 
 57. What is an ICO?, supra note 11. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. (“[B]lockchain developers realized that . . . launch[ing] a token was still much easier than 
pursuing seed rounds through the usual venture capital model.”). 
 60. Virtual Currencies, supra note 12, at 0:15:00 (statement of Mike Lempres, Chief Legal & Risk 
Officer at Coinbase). 
 61. Id. 
 62. Cryptocurrency ICO Stats 2017, COINSCHEDULE, https://www.coinsched-
ule.com/stats.html?year=2017 (last visited Sept. 29, 2018). 
 63. Virtual Currencies, supra note 12, at 00:02:00 (statement of Bill Huizenga, Chairman, H. Sub. 
Comm. on Capital Mkts., Sec. & Inv.). 
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Protocol Labs.64 Of the $257 million raised in the first month of Protocol Labs’s 
ICO, $187 million was collected within the first hour.65 The most impressive part 
of this record-breaking event is that Protocol Labs’s data storage project had no 
scheduled launch date at the time of its ICO.66 So, more than 2,100 investors from 
50 countries gave $257 million to the Filecoin project, and the customers received 
no Filecoins in return, nor did they know when the Filecoins would be distributed.67 
Filecoin ICO buyers did, however, receive a Simple Agreement for Future Tokens 
(“SAFT”), a contract promising coins would be distributed upon the eventual com-
pletion of the project.68 While the Protocol Labs’s ICO shows that ICOs can be a 
legitimate alternative to traditional fundraising, they are largely unregulated and 
this uncertainty puts buyers and sellers at risk.69 
Technically speaking, conducting an ICO is a lengthy and complicated process 
that is generally conducted in the following manner. First, a blockchain company 
writes and publishes an electronic white paper detailing the company’s vision of the 
blockchain-enabled project.70 Then, the company creates its new cryptocurrency 
and advertises the ICO.71 The ICO usually has a set number of tokens capable of 
being sold, and the ICO ends when the token limit is reached.72 However, this is not 
how it always happens. Problems begin to occur when bad actors enter the space 
looking for a get-rich-quick opportunity.73 The problems that bad actors created will 
be explored in more depth later in this article. 
For now, it is important to understand the different types of cryptocurrency, the 
potential benefits of blockchain technology, and how ICOs can provide blockchain-
based projects with vibrant sources of capital. While more could be said about each 
fundamental concept, this article now turns to the current state of everything crypto-
related. Fraud was rampant in past ICOs, and part of this is due to the regulatory                                                           
 64. FILECOIN, https://filecoin.io/ (last visited Sept. 29, 2018) (Filecoin is an online storage program 
allowing people to securely store their files on a “decentralized storage network.” What this means is if 
you stored your information on Filecoin, your data would be fragmented and stored across the world 
thanks to blockchain technology. Filecoin wants to offer you un-hackable storage. To use Filecoin’s 
data-storing services, you pay with “Filecoins.”). 
 65. Id.; Stan Higgins, $257 Million: Filecoin Breaks All-Time Record for ICO Funding, COINDESK, 
https://www.coindesk.com/257-million-filecoin-breaks-time-record-ico-funding/ (last updated Sept. 8, 
2017, 15:00 UTC); Paul Vigna, Latest Hot Digital Coin Offering: $187 Million in One Hour for Filecoin, 
WALL STREET J. (Aug. 12, 2017, 5:34 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/latest-hot-digital-coin-offer-
ing-187-millionin-one-hourfor-filecoin-1502481514. 
 66. Filecoin Sale Completed, PROTOCOL LABS (Sept. 13, 2017), https://protocol.ai/blog/filecoin-sale-
completed/ (“[W]e are excited and eager to return to what we do best: Building. We have a lot to build 
before . . . we can launch the network.”). 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. (In their update after the ICO, Protocol Labs explained the SAFT that customers paid for during 
the ICO would not yield actual coins until the Filecoin network launches.). 
 69. See generally EY Research, supra note 39, at 2, 36 (discussing the risks and rewards inherent in 
ICOs). 
 70. Cal Evans, How to Develop White Paper for ICO: Do’s and Don’ts, COINTELEGRAPH (Aug. 21, 
2017), https://cointelegraph.com/news/how-to-develop-white-paper-for-ico-dos-and-donts (explaining 
the most important element in an ICO is the White Paper). 
 71. Ray King, How to Create a Cryptocurrency, BITDEGREE, https://www.bitdegree.org/tutori-
als/how-to-create-a-cryptocurrency/ (last updated Sept. 17, 2018); Seema Mody, Katie Young & Darren 
Geeter, Creating Your Own Cryptocurrency? Here’s What You Need to Know, CNBC, 
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/05/09/creating-your-own-cryptocurrency-heres-what-you-need-to-
know.html (last updated May 15, 2018, 11:13 AM). 
 72. Antonio Madeira, How Does an ICO Work, CRYPTOCOMPARE (Jan. 14, 2018), https://www.cryp-
tocompare.com/coins/guides/how-does-an-ico-work/. 
 73. See infra Part III.C. 
9
Briggs: Taming the Wild West: How the SEC Can Legitimize Initial Coin Off
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2018
Iss. 2] Briggs: Taming the Wild West of ICOs 433 
gray area that ICOs operate in. The next part will analyze the laws that potentially 
apply to ICOs, examine why the regulatory gray area exists, and then look at exam-
ples of ICO fraud that may have been exacerbated by this gray enforcement area. 
III. THE CURRENT STATE OF CRYPTO-RELATED LAWS AND FRAUD 
A.   Who May Regulate the Initial Sale of Cryptocurrency 
and What Laws May Apply? 
There is current uncertainty about who may regulate coins and tokens, primar-
ily because they do not fit cleanly within pre-defined bodies of law.74 However, the 
SEC has jurisdiction over all “securities.”75 The SEC originally defined a “security” 
as “any note, stock, treasury stock, security future, security-based swap, bond, de-
benture, evidence of indebtedness, . . . [or] investment contract . . . .”76 Thus, if an 
ICO sells securities, the SEC’s federal securities laws apply. So, the key question is 
whether cryptocurrency sold in ICOs are securities. 
The SEC believes that ICOs sell securities, and this is evidenced by three state-
ments. The SEC’s first ICO-specific statement restated the general law that if a 
blockchain company sells securities in an ICO, it must register those securities with 
the SEC: 
[T]he federal securities laws apply to those who offer and sell securities in 
the United States, regardless whether the issuing entity is a traditional 
company or a decentralized autonomous organization, regardless whether 
those securities are purchased using U.S. dollars or virtual currencies, and 
regardless whether they are distributed in certificated form or through dis-
tributed ledger [blockchain] technology.77 
Second, the SEC said that most ICOs appear to sell securities: 
Prospective purchasers are being sold on the potential for tokens to in-
crease in value—with the ability to lock in those increases by reselling the 
tokens on a secondary market—or to otherwise profit from the tokens 
based on the efforts of others. These are key hallmarks of a security and a 
securities offering.78 
Finally, in February 2018, SEC Chairman Clayton said, “I believe every ICO 
I’ve seen is a security.”79 Thus, the SEC thinks it has clear jurisdiction over ICOs. 
                                                          
 74. See Bennington, supra note 42. 
 75. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Issues Investigative Report Concluding DAO 
Tokens, a Digital Asset, Were Securities (July 25, 2017) https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2017-
131 [hereinafter DAO Tokens]. 
 76. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 77. DAO Tokens, supra note 75. 
 78. Clayton Statement, supra note 31. 
 79. Higgins, supra note 40. 
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Congress created the SEC in direct response to the massive stock market crash 
in 1929 that began the Great Depression.80 The SEC’s website explains its origin 
story, and it coincidentally parallels the so-called “Bitcoin Bubble”: 
Tempted by promises of “rags to riches” transformations and easy credit, 
most investors gave little thought to the systemic risk that arose from wide-
spread abuse of margin financing and unreliable information about the se-
curities in which they were investing. During the 1920s, approximately 20 
million large and small shareholders took advantage of post-war prosperity 
and set out to make their fortunes in the stock market. It is estimated that 
of the $50 billion in new securities offered during this period, half became 
worthless.81 
Four years later, Congress passed the Securities Act of 1933 (“the 33 Act”) to 
make sure that “investors receive financial and other significant information con-
cerning securities being offered for public sale; and prohibit deceit, misrepresenta-
tions, and other fraud in the sale of securities.”82 The 33 Act accomplishes this ob-
jective by requiring sellers of securities to disclose certain information to the SEC 
prior to the sale.83 This information includes a description of the company’s busi-
ness, a description of the security to be sold, and the company’s management infor-
mation.84 Filed information is made public prior to the sale so that prospective pur-
chasers may make an informed investment decision.85 The 33 Act protects investors 
by allowing them to recover losses that result from material errors in the disclosure 
statements.86 It is important to note that certain small securities offerings are exempt 
from filing.87 
Because the 33 Act governs the initial sale of securities from the company to 
investors, Congress also passed the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“the 34 
Act”).88 The 34 Act allows the SEC to regulate the sale of securities in the secondary 
market (when the initial investor re-sells their security to another investor).89 The 
34 Act, among other things, prohibits all fraud in relation to offering, buying, and 
selling securities in the secondary markets.90 
The purpose of the 33 Act is to ensure investors have enough information to 
make informed investment decisions, and to ensure sellers of securities accurately 
disclose all necessary information.91 Additionally, the 34 Act allows the SEC to 
police fraudulent actors in the secondary market and hold them responsible.92 These 
laws, however, only apply if the item in question is indeed a security. Knowing the                                                           
 80. U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, What We Do, https://www.sec.gov/Article/whatwedo.html (last up-
dated June 10, 2013). 
 81. Id. 
 82. U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, The Laws That Govern the Securities Industry, 
https://www.sec.gov/answers/about-lawsshtml.html (last updated Oct. 1, 2013). 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
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general laws that may apply to cryptocurrency sold in an ICO is important, but the 
next part addresses the question of whether ICOs actually sell securities. Ultimately, 
it will show how the law is not clear on this issue. 
B.    Is a Utility Token a Security? Why the SEC’s Howey Test 
Does Not Work Well 
As explained above, SEC Chairman Clayton believes every cryptocurrency 
sold in an ICO is a security and should follow SEC regulations.93 This article’s tax-
onomy of cryptocurrency indicated that of the three different types of cryptocur-
rency, security tokens are the only type of cryptocurrency intended to function as 
securities.94 However, security tokens are rarely used.95 This means that Chairman 
Clayton and the SEC believe the majority of cryptocurrencies not intended to be 
securities (i.e., utility tokens) are still securities. 
The author agrees that utility tokens sold in an ICO should be classified as 
securities under federal securities laws because of the protections that the 33 Act 
and the 34 Act give investors. Unfortunately, utility tokens do not fit neatly within 
the existing definition of security.96 Therefore, this creates a regulatory gray area.97 
Accordingly, the SEC should pass two new laws. First, the SEC should expand the 
definition of a security to include utility tokens. Such expansion will provide federal 
securities law protection to utility token purchasers, and it will require companies 
conducting an ICO to disclose material information to the SEC.98 Second, a com-
plimentary SEC regulation should be passed that holds utility token sellers to sim-
pler registration requirements than other sellers of securities. This second regulation 
will be explored in more depth in Part IV. In order to understand why the definition 
of security should be broadened, this article applies the existing definition of a se-
curity to utility tokens sold in an ICO. Like a square peg in a round hole, utility 
tokens do not perfectly fit under the current definition of a security. 
i. The Howey Test  
Section 2(1) of the 33 Act said “any note, stock, treasury stock, security future, 
security-based swap, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, . . . [or] investment 
contract” is a security.99 Then, in 1946, the Supreme Court’s seminal decision in 
SEC v. W.J. Howey greatly expanded the definition of security.100 Howey relied on 
the “investment contract” language to hold that an investment in an orange growing 
business was a security.101 The Court in Howey identified that “predominantly busi-
ness and professional people who lack[ed] the skill and equipment necessary for the 
                                                          
 93. Higgins, supra note 40. 
 94. See supra Part II.A. 
 95. EY Research, supra note 39. 
 96. Kastelein, supra note 10. 
 97. Id. 
 98. 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a) (this information is filed in a registration statement). 
 99. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 100. S.E.C. v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 297 (1946) (“‘[S]ecurity’ . . . include[s] the commonly 
known documents traded for speculation or investment.”). 
 101. Id. at 301. 
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care” of the orange growing business were “attracted by the expectation of substan-
tial profits.”102 Thus, according to the famed “Howey Test,” an investment contract 
is considered a security when someone makes (1) an investment of money, (2) in a 
common enterprise, and (3) is led to expect profits (4) primarily from the efforts of 
others.103 
The 72-year-old Howey Test is why SEC Chairman Clayton considers utility 
tokens to be securities.104 Clayton argues that those who buy cryptocurrency in 
ICOs, regardless of whether the seller intended it as a security or not, “are being 
sold on the potential for tokens to increase in value—with the ability to lock in those 
increases by reselling the tokens on a secondary market.”105 Obviously, § 2(1)’s 
definition of security does not mention cryptocurrency.106 So, it is the catch-all na-
ture of “investment contracts” that may subject utility tokens to SEC authority. 
Now, this article applies the four prongs of the Howey Test to utility tokens to see 
if they are securities or not. 
ii.   Why Expanding the Definition of Security to Include 
Utility Tokens Eliminates Confusion 
The Howey Test requires the “contract, transaction[,] or scheme” at issue to 
meet all four of its prongs in order to be considered a security.107 If any prong is not 
met, there is no security and securities laws will not apply. Because the ICO com-
munity would like to know if they must comply with securities laws, legal scholars, 
practitioners, and blockchain experts have applied the Howey Test to ICOs. How-
ever, their conclusions are at odds with each other. 
To demonstrate these conflicting views on a key issue, a white paper written 
by Protocol Labs, the company that created Filecoin, and Cooley, a global law firm 
(“the Protocol Labs white paper”), will be contrasted with a white paper written by 
the Cardozo Law School’s Blockchain Project (“the Cardozo white paper”).108 The 
purpose of this section is to show how legal experts disagree about the answer to 
the key question: do securities laws apply to ICOs? Because of a lack of agreement, 
expanding the definition of security to include utility tokens will eliminate the need 
to apply the confusing Howey Test in the future. 
According to the Protocol Labs white paper, the first prong of the Howey 
Test—an “investment in money”—is almost always satisfied when an ICO sells 
utility tokens. This is because case law has held over the years that exchanging 
                                                          
 102. Id. at 296 (emphasis added). 
 103. Id. at 298-99. 
 104. Clayton Statement, supra note 31. 
 105. Id. 
 106. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2012). 
 107. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. at 298–99. 
 108. Juan Batiz-Benet, Jesse Clayburgh & Marco Santori, THE SAFT PROJECT: TOWARD A COMPLIANT 
TOKEN SALE FRAMEWORK, PROTOCOL LABS (Oct. 2, 2017), https://saftproject.com/static/SAFT-
Project-Whitepaper.pdf [hereinafter THE PROTOCOL LABS WHITE PAPER]; NOT SO FAST—RISKS 
RELATED TO THE USE OF A “SAFT” FOR TOKEN SALES, CARDOZO BLOCKCHAIN PROJECT (Nov. 21, 
2017), https://cardozo.yu.edu/sites/default/files/Cardozo%20Blockchain%20Project%20-
%20Not%20So%20Fast%20-%20SAFT%20Response_final.pdf [hereinafter THE CARDOZO WHITE 
PAPER]. 
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currency, cryptocurrency, donations, or labor constitutes an investment of 
money.109 
The second prong of the Howey Test requires money to be invested “in a com-
mon enterprise.”110 Because courts apply different tests, the Protocol Labs white 
paper argues that the common enterprise prong is sometimes satisfied when an ICO 
sells utility tokens.111 The majority of courts apply the “horizontal commonality 
test,” which finds a common enterprise exists when “multiple investors pool assets 
and share together in the profits and risks of the enterprise.”112 A minority of courts 
apply the “vertical commonality test,” which can either be applied narrowly or 
broadly.113 Under the narrow vertical commonality test, a common enterprise exists 
“where the fortunes of the investors are bound up with the actual fortunes of the 
promoter or issuer of the security.”114 Compare that to the broad vertical common-
ality test that finds a “common enterprise exists where the fortunes of the investors 
are bound up with the mere efforts of the promoter or issuer.”115 
Focusing on the majority’s horizontal commonality test, the Protocol Labs 
white paper argues the second prong is met if “[(1)] [the] tokens are fungible, [(2)] 
the entity pools all the money raised from selling the tokens, and [(3)] the entity 
uses the pooled funds to build the network.”116 While a utility token sold in an ICO 
will usually satisfy the common enterprise prong if courts apply the majority hori-
zontal commonality test, the Protocol Labs white paper says the second prong 
would rarely be satisfied in a minority jurisdiction.117 However, this is due to nu-
anced complexities relating to the way ICOs are carried out which are beyond the 
scope of this article.118 For now, this article moves on without explaining how ICOs 
fit within the minority test. 
The third prong of the Howey Test requires investors to have an “expectation 
of profits.”119 This means that investors “expect[] capital appreciation resulting 
from the development of the initial investment or expected participation in earnings 
resulting from the use of investor funds.”120 Citing case law, the Protocol Labs white 
paper distinguishes that the expectation of profit requirement is not satisfied when 
the purchaser “is motivated primarily by the desire to use or consume the item pur-
chased,” but is satisfied when “the purchaser’s expectation of profit . . . predomi-
nate[s] the expectation of using the thing purchased.”121 The Protocol Labs white 
paper concludes most ICOs satisfy this prong because “purchasers seem predomi-
nantly motivated by a desire to profit from the transaction. Most seem to hope to 
sell the token at a higher price than they paid.”122 
The Protocol Labs white paper argues that the final prong, “from the efforts of 
others,” is the most controversial because it hinges on two things: (1) whether the                                                           
 109. THE PROTOCOL LABS WHITE PAPER, supra note 108, at 7. 
 110. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. at 298–99. 
 111. THE PROTOCOL LABS WHITE PAPER, supra note 108, at 7. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. (emphasis added). 
 115. Id. (emphasis added). 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. at 298–99. 
 120. THE PROTOCOL LABS WHITE PAPER, supra note 108, at 8. 
 121. Id. (emphasis added). 
 122. Id. 
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predominant reason tokens were purchased was a desire for profit, and (2) whether 
the token is “functional.”123 Protocol Labs goes on to explain that selling functional 
utility tokens to anyone, regardless of whether they intend to actually use the token 
or merely profit from their resale on a secondary market, fails the Howey Test.124 
A blockchain company conducting an ICO—the “others” whose efforts are relied 
upon—works to create a functional token.125 Once the token and project are func-
tional, however, the Protocol Labs white paper argues there are no more efforts to 
rely upon that will lead to significant profit appreciation.126 Additionally, small im-
provements to the functional project will not greatly impact the value of a utility 
token. This is because other market factors will equally impact the token’s value by 
the time the token is functional.127 However, the Protocol Labs white paper suggests 
a pre-functional utility token sold in an ICO to a purchaser with an expectation of 
profits “is very likely to be predominantly from the ‘efforts of others’” because the 
blockchain team still has the potential to substantially increase the value of the util-
ity token.128 
To summarize the Protocol Labs white paper, the investment of money prong 
is almost always satisfied in an ICO that sells utility tokens. The common enterprise 
prong is usually satisfied in majority jurisdictions, but is rarely satisfied in minority 
jurisdictions. The expectation of profits prong is usually satisfied because the Pro-
tocol Labs white paper argues most people purchase utility tokens to re-sell at a 
higher price on the secondary market. Finally, the requirement that the profits come 
from the efforts of others is not satisfied if the utility token is functional at the time 
of sale. Remember, an Ernst & Young market research report identified that most 
ICOs did not sell functional utility tokens.129 Thus, it appears that if a court applied 
the Howey Test to a typical ICO in a majority jurisdiction, it would likely conclude 
that the ICO sold securities. Federal securities laws would then apply. 
Although the Protocol Labs white paper makes the Howey Test analysis appear 
simple, the Cardozo white paper directly disagrees with the Protocol Labs white 
paper’s conclusion. The Cardozo white paper argues that the Protocol Labs white 
paper incorrectly simplifies the analysis of whether a token is a security based on 
whether or not the token is “functional.”130 The Cardozo white paper points out that 
courts do not “turn on bright-line rules” and instead analyze a wide range of factors 
to determine security status.131 Additionally, the Cardozo white paper advises ICOs 
to not rely on the Protocol Labs white paper because it may expose them to future 
legal trouble.132 The Protocol Labs white paper concluded that selling functional 
utility tokens likely does not satisfy the Howey Test, but the Cardozo white paper 
                                                          
 123. Id. at 8–9 (the term “functional” refers to whether the token can be redeemed for blockchain ser-
vices. Some utility tokens, like Filecoin, were sold before the Filecoin data-storage project was opera-
tional. So, at the time of the Filecoin ICO, Filecoins would not be functional. Once the project is open 
for business, however, Filecoins could be exchanged for data storage, and Filecoins would then be func-
tional). 
 124. Id. at 9. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. at 10. 
 128. Id. at 11. 
 129. EY Research, supra note 39, at 15 (only 5% of ICOs sold its utility tokens when the blockchain 
project was functional). 
 130. THE CARDOZO WHITE PAPER, supra note 108, at 3–4. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
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points out that there is “sparse and controversial legal support” for that conclu-
sion.133 Specifically, the Cardozo white paper highlights that the case law relied on 
by the Protocol Labs white paper dealt with natural resources and commodities like 
gold and sugar.134 The Cardozo white paper accordingly believes that those cases 
“are inapposite to the critical question that courts will need to grapple with when 
dealing with utility tokens: whether the utility tokens, in and of themselves, will be 
deemed investment contracts under Howey.”135 
The contradicting points made by the Cardozo white paper and the Protocol 
Labs white paper show that intellectuals disagree on the most important issue: 
whether federal securities laws apply to ICOs. This shows why there is a current 
regulatory gray area in the ICO space. Thus, expanding the definition of a security 
to include utility tokens would eliminate confusion. A blanket approach that classi-
fies all utility tokens as securities is beneficial in three ways: (1) requiring block-
chain companies to register its utility tokens with the SEC prior to selling creates 
more accountability; (2) token purchasers receive the safety given to securities hold-
ers under federal security laws; and (3) the SEC receives the convenience of not 
having to run every ICO through the fact-specific Howey Test. This suggestion is 
further explored in Part IV. 
Experts in the field generally agree with this article that the SEC needs new 
ICO-specific laws. Robert Rosenblum, a leading cryptocurrency attorney from San 
Francisco, made it clear that it is too early to craft serious, long-term regulations 
because the ICO space is so new and volatile.136 However, in the short term, the 
SEC needs to “both modify and amend their rules to better assist ICO issuers in 
meeting the requirements of the federal securities laws” which will help “to facili-
tate good ICOs and to help guard against fraud.” This is because Rosenblum says 
the current SEC laws “do not work well” with ICOs.137 One reason for this statement 
may be that complying with federal securities laws requires significant money and 
time—two resources startup blockchain companies may not have.138 
C.   Why ICOs Need New Laws: Current Problems in the 
ICO and Blockchain Space 
Even amidst the regulatory gray area that ICOs operate in, ICOs are here to 
stay. Reputable venture capitalists, like Brock Pierce and Bart Stephens of Block-
chain Capital, and global law firms, like DLA Piper and Cooley, are now working 
with ICO companies.139 ICOs have also provided an opportunity for obsolete com-
panies, like Atari and Kodak, to become relevant again after both saw their stock 
prices skyrocket following future ICO plan announcements.140 Even SEC Chairman                                                           
 133. Id. at 6. 
 134. Id. at 6-7. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Virtual Currencies: Examining the Cryptocurrencies and ICO Markets, supra note 12, at 00:26:10 
(statement of Robert Rosenblum, cryptocurrency attorney). 
 137. Id. at 00:24:55 (emphasis added). 
 138. See infra Part IV.A. 
 139. Mason Borda, Beyond the Red Tape: The Path Ahead for Token Sales, COINDESK, 
https://www.coindesk.com/beyond-red-tape-path-ahead-token-sales/ (last updated Jan. 14, 2018, 17:43 
UTC). 
 140. Stan Higgins, Game Maker Atari is Planning to Launch its Own Cryptocurrency, COINDESK (Feb. 
15, 2018, 19:45 UTC), https://www.coindesk.com/game-maker-atari-planni. 
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Clayton believes ICOs have the potential to be an “effective way[] for entrepreneurs 
and others to raise funding.”141 
However, amidst this growing attention, many ICOs subjected token purchas-
ers to rampant fraud over the past year. For example, in December 2017, the SEC 
froze the assets of a blockchain company called PlexCoin after its ICO raised $15 
million by fraudulently promising investors a 13-fold return on investment.142 Then, 
on January 30, 2018, the SEC froze $600 million raised by AriseBank’s in-progress 
ICO.143 The SEC alleged that AriseBank fraudulently told investors it was an FDIC-
insured bank.144 To make matters worse, AriseBank’s founder was on probation for 
felony theft at the time of the ICO.145 Similarly, on April 2, 2018, criminal charges 
were filed against the founders of Centra Tech Inc. after it fraudulently raised $32 
million from more than 1,000 ICO purchasers.146 Centra Tech is the most egregious 
example of ICO fraud.147 Endorsed by pop music icon DJ Khaled,148 Centra Tech 
tricked investors by promising a debit card backed by Visa and MasterCard that 
would allow card holders to spend their Bitcoin in stores.149 These three examples 
are just a few of the many fraudulent ICOs that have stolen millions of dollars from 
ICO purchasers. Accordingly, ICOs need regulation to hold these fraudsters ac-
countable. 
In addition to the fraudulent ICOs that caught the SEC’s attention, Ernst & 
Young authored a 44-page ICO report (“the Report”) at the end of 2017 that ana-
lyzed 372 total ICOs.150 The Report shows several problems with the way current 
ICOs are ran, and it also provides some guidance for the next steps in ICO regula-
tion.  
First, the Report concluded “[m]ost ICO white papers lack a clear explanation 
of the business reasons for blockchain and token currency (utility token). As a re-
sult, many projects never move from the ideation state to implementation, or the 
implementation is flawed.”151 This is because many view ICOs as a “get rich quick” 
                                                          
 141. Clayton Statement, supra note 31. 
 142. Laura Shin, $15 Million ICO Halted by SEC for Being Alleged Scam, FORBES (Dec. 4, 2017, 2:46 
PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/laurashin/2017/12/04/15-million-ico-halted-by-sec-for-being-al-
leged-scam/#4d9279971569. 
 143. Matt Robinson, SEC Freezes Crypto Assets of $600 Million Initial Coin Offering, BLOOMBERG 
(Jan. 30, 2018, 8:25 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-01-30/sec-seeks-to-freeze-
crypto-assets-of-600-million-coin-offering. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. (Former heavyweight boxing champion, Evander Holyfield, was an actual endorser of the 
AriseBank project. You cannot make this stuff up.). 
 146. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Halts Fraudulent Scheme Involving Unregistered 
ICO (Apr. 2, 2018) https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2018-53 [hereinafter Unregistered ICO]. 
 147. Lucinda Shen, SEC Charges $32 Million DJ Khaled-Backed Centra ICO With Fraud, FORTUNE 
(Apr. 3, 2018), 
http://fortune.com/2018/04/03/floyd-mayweather-dj-khaled-centra-tech-ico-sec-fraud/. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Unregistered ICO, supra note 146. 
 150. EY Research, supra note 39, at 1–2. 
 151. Id. at 10. 
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opportunity, so more work is placed on trying to attract investors.152 The Report 
argues utility tokens are rarely needed.153 
Second, the Report points out that 84% of the ICOs observed sold tokens in the 
businesses’ “idea stage,” compared to only 5% who sold after its project was al-
ready running.154 Of the projects still in the idea stage, 32% had no stated anticipated 
date of completion.155 Third, ICOs are carried out online via “smart contracts”—
programed code designed to automatically carry out the ICO.156 The problem is that 
many of these smart contracts contain errors.157 For example, the Report found one 
ICO’s smart contract contained two lines of code: one was shown to the investor 
and the other was hidden.158 The hidden portion had contract terms that allowed the 
seller to change the duration of the ICO sale (diluting the token value), issue new 
tokens at any time, and destroy tokens at any time.159 
Fourth, ICOs are popular targets for hackers, and Ernst & Young argues many 
project founders do not prioritize security.160 The Report identified that 10% of all 
ICO funds are lost due to hacking, and the most popular hacking methods include 
(1) creating a fake website that looks identical to the original (“phishing”), thereby 
tricking the investor to spend money on the false site, (2) directly hacking the ICO 
website, and (3) hacking the information of the investors.161 If a bank were hacked, 
lost funds would be insured, however, “Most exchanges do not disclose policies and 
controls over personal data storage. . . . This represents great value on the black 
market.”162 
Finally, the Report recommends three areas of future action to “decrease inves-
tor risk” and turn ICOs into an “effective financing tool for quality blockchain pro-
jects.”163 First, project founders must justify the need for their utility token, focus 
on investor security, and strictly comply with the law in all countries where the 
tokens will be used.164 Second, the Report encourages investors to perform due dil-
igence and analyze the smart contract code when possible.165 Finally, regulators 
should “standardize minimum requirements for reporting,” which should be easy 
since the blockchain is public and can allow automatic reporting.166 Regulators are 
also encouraged to create protections for token buyers while they wait to receive 
their tokens as the project is built.167 
                                                          
 152. Id. at 11 (explaining that many white papers contain “many clichés that attract inexperienced in-
vestors” and provides a list of the most commonly used phrases in white papers, including “next-gener-
ation platform” and “most undervalued token”); Covesting, Thousands of Ordinary Investors are getting 
Rich through ICOs, MEDIUM (Nov. 27, 2017), https://medium.com/@Covesting/thousands-of-ordinary-
investors-are-getting-rich-through-icos-9100d6b91ed8. 
 153. EY Research, supra note 39, at 15. 
 154. Id. at 16. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. at 18. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. at 22. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. at 30. 
 161. Id. at 31. 
 162. Id. at 33. 
 163. Id. at 40. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. 
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Part III showed that the SEC is the regulating agency that most likely has ju-
risdiction over ICOs. Additionally, Part III showed the different securities laws that 
may apply to ICOs if an ICO sells a security. Because everything hinges on whether 
ICOs sell securities, this article analyzed the Howey Test and showed how experts 
in the field disagree about whether ICOs sell securities or not. Finally, Part III pro-
vided a snapshot of some of the problems that ICOs face right now. Some of those 
problems stem from fraudulent actors, while others stem from the lack of a stand-
ardized ICO process. Now that the current legal climate is understood, this article 
proposes new ICO-specific regulations that should be enacted to fix the above-men-
tioned problems. 
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR NEW, ICO-SPECIFIC REGULATIONS 
First, recall that there are three types of cryptocurrency: coins, security tokens, 
and utility tokens.168 Utility tokens are the only type relevant to this section of the 
article. If an ICO intends to sell virtual currency or digital gold (coins), CFTC laws 
should govern.169 Likewise, if an ICO sells tokens that give equity or voting rights 
to its holder (security tokens), that is a security and existing securities law will ap-
ply.170 This part deals with tokens like Filecoin; while some investors will buy a 
Filecoin hoping the value will appreciate, others desire to pre-purchase blockchain 
storage services.171 
Additionally, “Congress has a responsibility to ensure investors are protected 
without unduly limiting opportunities for growth.”172 In his book, How to Regulate, 
Professor Thomas Lambert explains how policymakers should only pass regula-
tions that eventually lead to the “greatest net benefit” for everyone involved.173 Ap-
plying that framework to ICOs, the author believes that the greatest net benefit is 
one where fraud is removed from the ICO space, ICOs become a legitimate means 
of fundraising for blockchain companies, and everyone—not just accredited inves-
tors—can access blockchain companies. An indirect benefit of these ICO-specific 
regulations is an ecosystem that encourages and fosters blockchain technology 
growth. The author’s view is supported by Mike Lempres, Chief Legal and Risk 
Officer at Coinbase, the largest cryptocurrency exchange in the world. Lempres told 
the House Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Securities, and Investment that Coin-
base welcomes new regulation to “ensure investor protection.”174 Lempres supports 
this article’s regulatory balancing approach as demonstrated by the following state-
ment: 
                                                          
 168. See supra Part II.A. 
 169. Bitcoin Basics, U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N 1, 
http://www.cftc.gov/idc/groups/public/@customerprotection/documents/file/oceo_bitcoin-
basics0218.pdf (last visited Oct. 6, 2018). 
 170. See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2012). 
 171. Joey Krug, Why Amazon’s Margin Is Filecoin’s Opportunity, FORBES (Aug. 18, 2017, 9:00 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/joeykrug/2017/08/18/why-amazons-margin-is-filecoins-oppor-
tunity/#2f934de324dd (“Filecoin is a cryptocurrency that is used to pay for storage space on IPFS, a 
global filesystem that allows storage of large amounts of data.”). 
 172. Virtual Currencies, supra note 12, at 00:07:33 (statement of Rep. Randy Hultgren). 
 173. THOMAS A. LAMBERT, HOW TO REGULATE: A GUIDE FOR POLICYMAKERS 14 (2017). 
 174. Virtual Currencies, supra note 12, at 00:15:15 (statement of Mike Lempres, Chief Legal and Risk 
Officer at Coinbase). 
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In order to fully enable ICOs, investors must have confidence in the integrity 
of the market. For this reason, we support enforcement actions where they are nec-
essary to weed out bad actors and to protect investors. At the same time, we need 
to be sure we are not chilling innovation brought about by new technology and good 
actors.175 
A.   A More Lenient Filing Requirement: Standardized White 
Paper and “Token Registration” 
Part III suggested that the definition of a security should be broadened to in-
clude utility tokens, which would require blockchain companies to comply with 
SEC registration requirements before conducting an ICO.176 Part III also suggested 
that the SEC should simultaneously create a more lenient registration standard for 
companies conducting an ICO. This is because it is expensive and time-consuming 
to comply with existing securities laws in order to legally sell securities. A report 
issued by PricewaterhouseCoopers estimates companies who follow all registration 
requirements and carry out an IPO spend $3.7 million.177 This includes the legal 
costs of drafting the SEC registration statements, accounting costs to audit the com-
pany, and filing fees.178 While costs vary significantly depending on the complexity 
and size of the sale, a small blockchain company could realistically spend $1 million 
to comply with all regulations.179 Then, after initially filing, additional costs are 
necessary to comply with the SEC’s quarterly and annual filings, conduct annual 
audits, hire internal and external accountants, and retain a law firm.180 More re-
search is needed in order to accurately estimate the cost for a small team conducting 
an ICO.181 
Because of the time and money required to comply with current SEC registra-
tion requirements, a more lenient registration requirement for ICO companies is 
needed. Under this new standard, anyone conducting an ICO to sell utility tokens 
would file a detailed white paper with the SEC, and the SEC should establish min-
imum white paper disclosure requirements. This proposed regulation is supported 
by Ernst & Young’s market research that encouraged regulators to “standardize 
minimum requirements for reporting.”182 A company conducting an IPO must file 
a prospectus with the SEC that “clearly describe[s] important information about [the 
seller’s] business operations, financial condition, results of operations, risk factors, 
and management.”183 Therefore, a standardized white paper should, at a minimum,                                                           
 175. Id. (emphasis added). 
 176. 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a), (c) (2012). 
 177. Considering an IPO?: The Costs of Going and Being Public May Surprise You 4, STRATEGY&, 
https://www.strategyand.pwc.com/media/file/Strategyand_Considering-an-IPO.pdf (last visited Nov. 
18, 2018) (IPO data must be analyzed because no ICO registration information being available at the 
time of this writing). 
 178. Id. at 8. 
 179. Id. at 5 (“87% of CFOs participating in PwC’s recent survey of US firms that have gone public in 
the past several years indicated that their firms spent more than $1 million on one-time costs associated 
with the transaction.”). 
 180. Id. at 17-32. 
 181. Id. at 33 (“Additionally, as these costs can vary both in size and type, there is no uniform and 
consistent methodology used to estimate the costs of being a public company.”). 
 182. EY Research, supra note 39, at 40. 
 183. U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, What is a Registration Statement?, https://www.sec.gov/smallbusi-
ness/goingpublic/registrationstatement (last updated Nov. 29, 2017). 
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inform token purchasers about the following: (1) what problems the company’s 
blockchain project solves; (2) what rights a token holder will and will not receive; 
(3) when the blockchain project will be completed; and (4) why a token is necessary 
in the first place. Ernst & Young’s market research concluded most ICOs “lack[ed] 
a clear explanation of the business reasons for blockchain and . . . utility tokens.”184 
In addition to filing a white paper, this article also recommends that a company 
conducting an ICO should be allowed to file a device referred to here as a “token 
registration” in place of a prospectus. A token registration is a document that would 
contain basic information about the company, its founders, the number of tokens 
being sold, and the token price. The token registration and white paper should both 
be filed with the SEC before the ICO through the SEC’s electronic data gathering, 
analysis, and retrieval (“EDGAR”) system.185 Documents filed through EDGAR 
are made public, and increase accountability.186 This ICO-specific filing require-
ment is ICO-friendly because companies conducting an ICO already write white 
papers,187 and the cost, while not specifically prescribed here, would ideally be 
much less than what companies pay to register for an IPO.188 
Support for requiring ICO companies to file a white paper and token registra-
tion is found generally with Georgetown University Law Professor Chris Brummer. 
He explained that one of the key reasons why the U.S. has such an advanced finan-
cial capital market is because of how much information is available to investors.189 
However, Professor Brummer identified a gap of quality information available 
when comparing a securities registration statement and an unregulated blockchain 
white paper.190 Professor Brummer then provided a list of disclosures he believes 
ICO token buyers need to know in order to make an informed decision: (1) the 
“promoter’s location . . . beyond a simple P.O. box,” because 32% of identified 
ICOs do not list this information; (2) a “problem and proposed technology solu-
tion,” because ICOs should be used to fund a technology-based solution to a prob-
lem, written in plain English; and (3) a list of “what legal rights holders of the tokens 
will [and will not] enjoy.”191 
B. Allow Everyone to Buy Utility Tokens 
As explained earlier, it is illegal for anyone to sell or offer to sell a security 
unless it is either registered with the SEC or is exempt from federal securities 
laws.192 So, if a blockchain company did not want to file expensive disclosures with 
the SEC under current law, it could try to find an exception to filling altogether. The 
most popular exception is complying with Regulation D (“Reg D”), which creates 
                                                          
 184. EY Research, supra note 39, at 10. 
 185. U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Filings & Forms, https://www.sec.gov/edgar.shtml (last updated Jan. 
9, 2017) (“Anyone can access and download this information for free.”). 
 186. Id. 
 187. Evans, supra note 70. 
 188. STRATEGY&, supra note 177, at 5 (“87% of CFOs participating in PwC’s recent survey of US 
firms that have gone public in the past several years indicated that their firms spent more than $1 million 
on one-time costs associated with the transaction.”). 
 189. Virtual Currencies, supra note 12, at 00:18:05 (statement of Professor Chris Brummer, 
Georgetown University Law). 
 190. Id. at 00:18:40. 
 191. Id. at 00:19:00 – 00:22:50. 
 192. See supra Part III; 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a), (c) (2012); See 15 U.S.C. § 77d (2015). 
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a bright-line registration exception for small securities offerings through Rule 504 
and Rule 506.193 A handful of ICOs, including Filecoin, have started to follow Reg 
D.194 However, Reg D imposes strict limits on who can purchase the security and 
how much money can be raised.195 
This proposed regulation suggests everyone should be able to buy utility tokens 
in an ICO. This regulation may be applied in one of two ways, depending on what 
the SEC chooses to do in the next few months. If the SEC expands the definition of 
security to include utility tokens, as introduced at the end of Part III, then this part 
should be viewed as introducing a framework for how to regulate ICOs moving 
forward: new ICO-specific securities laws should allow anyone to buy utility tokens 
in an ICO. However, if the SEC neither broadens the definition of a security nor 
creates a more lenient filing requirement, then this part should be viewed as a reg-
ulatory compromise: the SEC should simply eliminate the “accredited” and “so-
phisticated” requirements for a blockchain company following Reg D. In order to 
understand the merits of the second application—remove the accredited and sophis-
ticated requirements—the limits Reg D imposes through Rule 504 and 506 must be 
explored. 
Rule 504 allows a company to avoid filing with the SEC if it makes less than 
$5 million when selling the securities in a 12-month period.196 Companies following 
Rule 504 must still electronically file a “Form D” with the SEC, and the securities 
are “restricted” which means the security cannot be re-sold within the following 
year.197 
Rule 506 has two different standards, but a Form D must be filed either way, 
and all securities sold under Rule 506 are also restricted.198 Rule 506(b) allows a 
company to raise an unlimited amount of money; however the company cannot ad-
vertise the sale, and it must follow strict requirements for who it sells to.199 An un-
limited number of “accredited” and 35 “un-accredited” investors may purchase the 
unregistered 506(b) securities; an accredited investor is an individual whose net 
worth exceeds $1,000,000 or has net income exceeding $200,000 for the past two 
years.200 Regardless of whether an investor is accredited or not, all 506(b) investors 
must be “sophisticated,” which means they “have sufficient knowledge and experi-
ence in financial and business matters to make them capable of evaluating the merits 
and risks of the prospective investment.”201 
Alternatively, Rule 506(c) allows the following: the company may only sell to 
accredited investors, an unlimited number of accredited investors may participate, 
sophistication is not a requirement for the investors, and the company may advertise 
                                                          
 193. U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Fast Answers: Regulation D Offerings, https://www.sec.gov/fast-
answers/answers-regdhtm.html (last modified Nov. 27, 2017) [hereinafter Regulation D Offerings]. 
 194. JD Alois, Protocol Labs Files Two Form D’s with SEC Regarding Enormous Filecoin ICO, 
CROWDFUND INSIDER (Aug. 26, 2017, 9:32 AM), https://www.crowdfundinsider.com/2017/08/121075-
protocol-labs-files-two-form-ds-sec-regarding-enormous-filecoin-ico/; Higgins, supra note 65. 
 195. Regulation D Offerings, supra note 193. 
 196. U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Fast Answers: Rule 504 of Regulation D, https://www.sec.gov/fast-
answers/answers-rule504.html (last updated Nov. 27, 2017) [hereinafter Rule 504 of Regulation D]. 
 197. Id. 
 198. U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Fast Answers: Rule 506 of Regulation D, https://www.sec.gov/fast-
answers/answers-rule506htm.html (last modified Nov. 27, 2017) [hereinafter Rule 506 of Regulation 
D]. 
 199. Id. 
 200. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501 (2018); Rule 506 of Regulation D, supra note 198. 
 201. Id. 
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the sale.202 However, the company must “take reasonable steps to verify that the 
investors are accredited” which means the company must analyze investors’ tax 
returns and bank statements.203 
The SEC explains that, “One principal purpose of the accredited investor con-
cept is to identify persons who can bear the economic risk of investing in these 
unregistered securities.”204 The SEC allows some non-accredited investors to pur-
chase unregistered securities if they are “financially sophisticated or, in other words, 
have sufficient knowledge and experience in financial and business matters to eval-
uate the investment.”205 
This proposed regulation urges the SEC to allow anyone to purchase utility 
tokens in an ICO. If the SEC considers utility tokens to be securities while simulta-
neously creating the more lenient registration process, then this objective will come 
to fruition because there are no requirements imposed on who may purchase regis-
tered securities. However, if the SEC does not enact either proposed regulation 
mentioned above, a compromise is to allow ICOs to operate under Reg D without 
having to follow the “accredited” and “sophisticated” limitations. 
Utility tokens are fundamentally different from traditional investment devices 
like stock,206 and blockchain technology will grow faster when more people partic-
ipate in its development.207 Ethereum, today’s most popular blockchain and the 
blockchain most new ICOs launch projects on, was created by Vitalik Buterin, a 
19-year-old from Toronto.208 Additionally, most people who owned Bitcoin in early 
2018 were young minorities between the ages of 18-34.209 Young, non-accredited 
people want to own utility tokens, and new ICO regulations should allow it. Perhaps 
an attempt to compromise would be to create a blockchain sophistication test, and 
anyone who passes it can purchase utility tokens in an ICO. 
C.   Private Right of Action for Fraud in White Paper and 
“Token Registration” 
Congress should create a private right of action for individuals who purchase 
tokens in a fraudulent ICO. Currently, § 11 of the 33 Act, which applies to registered 
securities, creates civil liability for every director, underwriter, expert who helped 
to prepare, and every person who signs or is named in a filed registration statement 
that “contained an untrue statement of a material fact or omitted to state a material 
fact.”210 The SEC should create a similar private right of action for material mis-
statements and omissions in white paper filings and token registrations. 
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This proposed regulation lines up well with SEC Commissioner Elisse B. Wal-
ter’s statement in the Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance & Fi-
nancial Regulation: 
Because I believe that enforcement, and therefore statutory effectiveness, 
depends on a public-private partnership, I also believe that this judicial and 
Congressional trend away from private rights affects the Commission’s 
ability to enforce the securities laws. Admittedly, the agency’s reasons for 
bringing a case are broader than those of private litigants, and the standards 
associated with the agency’s cases differ from those in private actions. 
Nevertheless, public and private rights [of action] are the two pillars on 
which enforcement rests.211 
This article merely suggests a private right of action should exist. However, 
more consideration is necessary regarding how it should look. For example, the 
necessary pleading standard would need to be established because the burden of 
proof in pleading a § 11 claim has risen in some circuits over the years.212 Addition-
ally, courts would need to decide whether to use § 11 case law as precedent or blaze 
a new trail with ICO private rights of action. 
D.  Extend Securities Fraud Liability to Fraudulent ICO Ad-
vertisements 
Finally, the SEC should either create an ICO truth-in-advertising law or extend 
Rule 10b-5 (anti-fraud) liability to ICOs.213 Fraudulent ICOs like AriseBank and 
Centra Tech lied to its customers; AriseBank claimed it was FDIC insured, and 
Centra Tech promised customers a Visa-backed Bitcoin credit card.214 Fraudulent 
ICO advertisements reached such a boiling point that companies like Facebook de-
cided to ban all cryptocurrency and ICO-related advertisements.215 The SEC cur-
rently uses Rule 10b-5—which applies to both primary and secondary markets as 
well as both registered and unregistered securities—to police fraudulent advertise-
ments surrounding securities offerings.216 Rule 10b-5 requires the plaintiff to prove 
five elements: “(1) a material misrepresentation or omission of fact, (2) scienter, (3) 
                                                          
 211. Elisse Walter, The Interrelationship Between Public and Private Securities Enforcement, HARV. 
L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Dec. 11, 2011), https://corpgov.law.har-
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Claims, MINTZ (Nov. 30, 2016), https://www.securitiesmatters.com/2016/11/first-circuit-strengthens-
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 213. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (Rule 10b-5 allows anyone harmed by a misleading or fraudulent statements 
in connection with the sale of a security to have a private right of action against the party who caused 
the harm). 
 214. See supra Part III.C. 
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a connection with the purchase or sale of a security, (4) transaction and loss causa-
tion, and (5) economic loss.”217 If the SEC broadens its definition of a security to 
include utility tokens, then Rule 10b-5 protection would automatically extend to 
ICOs.218 However, if the SEC does not broaden the definition, this article argues 
that a separate law should be passed that will protect ICO purchasers from fraudu-
lent statements in ICO advertisements. 
E.   Other Non-Regulatory Actions Blockchain Companies 
Can Take to Help Standardize ICOs 
There are actions that ICO participants should take to do their part in further 
securing the space. First, companies conducting ICOs need to prioritize customer 
security. Ernst & Young explained that ICOs’ failure to prioritize security resulted 
in approximately 10% of all ICO funds being lost to hackers.219 Second, blockchain 
companies should use reputable ICO facilitators like CoinList to conduct their 
ICO.220 CoinList successfully ran the record-setting Filecoin ICO, and has helped 
more than 20 blockchain teams comply with existing SEC laws like background 
checking customers’ accredited and sophisticated status for Reg D.221 CoinList only 
partners with legitimate blockchain companies and maintains a database of vetted 
investors.222 Finally, token buyers should receive SAFTs—enforceable contracts 
guaranteeing the company’s eventual token issuance—from companies who con-
duct an ICO on one day, but will not issue tokens until the project is complete at a 
later date. Filecoin’s record-breaking ICO did this.223 Ernst & Young identified that 
84% of ICOs sold tokens in the “idea stage,” and so giving token buyers SAFTs 
will protect investors while they wait for their tokens.224 Ernst & Young called 
SAFTs a “notable” step towards protecting investors, and it was created by “indus-
try players” to “fill in regulatory gaps.”225 
F.   Secondary Market Regulation: Cryptocurrency-Specific 
Pump-and-Dump Liability 
A final suggestion for how the SEC can help legitimize cryptocurrency sales 
and exchanges is to extend Rule 10b-5 liability to cryptocurrency “pump-and-
dumpers” on the secondary market.226 For example, look at the self-proclaimed 
pump group, CryptoCalls.227 CryptoCalls picks an existing token and “skyrockets 
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the value . . . for six hours at a time.” CryptoCalls tells its members to purchase a 
token when it is cheap, and then it “will begin advertising it to other investors on 
social media.”228 Those advertisements artificially inflate, or “pump,” the value of 
the token up, and then CryptoCalls coordinates the massive sale, or “dump,” to 
“maximize profits” at the expense of others who buy CryptoCalls’s overpriced to-
kens, and it is those other buyers who hold the cryptocurrency as the price plummets 
back down.229 This is egregious fraudulent trading.230 These pumpers only purchase 
the stock to benefit from rapid price appreciation, which means they are securities, 
and extending 10b-5 criminal and civil liability would hopefully reduce this kind of 
fraud.231 
V. CONCLUSION 
ICOs are here to stay.232 Although ICO fraud was rampant in early 2018, and 
many believe cryptocurrency is a “bubble,” the proper goal is legitimizing ICOs to 
help fundraise blockchain projects, protect investors, and strengthen blockchain 
technology.233 ICOs allow entrepreneurs to raise money for blockchain-related pro-
jects, and everyone should have access to those projects. Stronger ICOs will hope-
fully lead to more blockchain development.234 
This article does not address regulation of virtual currencies like Bitcoin. Ad-
ditionally, blockchain technology is not the focus of this article, and this article is 
not an attempt to fix all the problems related to buying and selling cryptocurrency. 
Finally, it is important to acknowledge that many any are still skeptical about cryp-
tocurrency. In his opening statement to the House Subcommittee on Capital Mar-
kets, Securities, and Investments, Representative Brad Sherman’s first four words 
were, “Cryptocurrencies are a crock.” 235 Representative Sherman continued by say-
ing the following: 
What social benefit do [cryptocurrencies] provide? Well, they allow a few 
dozen men in my district to sit in their pajamas on the couch all day and 
tell their wives they’re going to be millionaires. The help terrorists and 
criminals move money around the world. They help tax-evaders. They 
                                                          
through social media, falsely inflate the price of that cryptocurrency at the expense of less informed 
consumers). 
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 229. Id. 
 230. See, e.g., United States v. Gordon, 710 F.3d 1124 (10th Cir. 2013) (holding that lawyer who 
pumped and dumped stock was subject to civil and criminal liability). 
 231. Higgins, supra note 40. (SEC chairman Clayton explained it is the desire for price appreciation 
that makes these coins and tokens securities). 
 232. See supra Part III.C. 
 233. Johnson, supra note 43 (the Bitcoin bubble may be a distraction from the underlying blockchain 
technology that is powerful because it is “open,” and the more people working on blockchain technology 
means it may reach its full potential sooner). 
 234. See id. (explaining “open” technology is most powerful when more people use it, like GPS and 
email). 
 235. Virtual Currencies: Examining the Cryptocurrencies and ICO Markets, supra note 12, at 00:08:50 
(statement of Rep. Brad Sherman). 
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help start-up companies commit fraud, take the money, and 1% of the time 
they actually create a useful business.236 
Indeed, this is only the beginning for the cryptocurrency regulatory debate. 
The end of Part III suggested that regulators should broaden the definition of a 
security to include utility tokens in order to provide securities law protection to 
token buyers. The truth is that some buy tokens in hopes of price appreciation, oth-
ers purchase tokens in order to one day use the blockchain enabled services—like 
storing information on Filecoin—and some buy with both intents simultaneously.237 
The uncertainty of whether utility tokens are securities under the Howey Test has 
allowed ICOs to operate in the regulatory grey area, and fraud has run rampant in 
the meantime. This article then proposed several regulations the SEC should pass, 
ideally in the next 12 months. These regulations try to balance the interests of re-
ducing fraud while still allowing ICOs to be funded. Hopefully, stories like Arise-
Bank stay in the past. Regardless, it seems clear that the first step towards taming 
the Wild West of ICOs is passing new, ICO-specific regulation. 
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